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Abstract
Background: Although values have increasingly received attention in psychiatric literature over the last three
decades, their role has been only partially acknowledged in psychiatric classification endeavors. The review process
of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) received harsh criticism,
and was even considered secretive by some authors. Also, it lacked an official discussion of values at play. In this
perspective paper we briefly discuss the interplay of some values in the scientific and non-scientific debate around
one of the most debated DSM-5 category proposals, the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (APS). Then, we point out
some ethical consequences of a facts-plus-values perspective in psychiatric classification.
Discussion: Different stakeholders participated in the APS-debate and for analytical purposes we divided them into
four groups: (i) researchers in the field of high-risk mental states; (ii) the DSM-5 Psychotic Disorders Work Group;
(iii) patient, carers and advocacy groups; and (iv) external stakeholders, not related to the previous groups, but
which also publicly expressed their opinions about APS inclusion in DSM-5. We found that each group differently
stressed the role of values we examined in the APS-debate. These values were ethical, but also epistemic, political,
economic and ontological. The prominence given to some values, and the lack of discussion about others,
generated divergent positions among stakeholders in the debate.
Summary: As exemplified by the APS discussion, although medicine is primarily an ethical endeavor, values of
different kinds that take part in it also shape to a large extent the profession. Thus, it may be strategic to openly
discuss values at play in the elaboration of diagnostic tools and classificatory systems. This task, more than
scientifically or politically significant, is ethically important.
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Background
Along with scientific data, values have increasingly re-
ceived attention in psychiatric literature over the last three
decades. Authors in philosophy of psychiatry have stressed
the importance of values in psychiatric diagnosis, treat-
ment, research and classification [1, 2]. Researchers in the
field have developed a values-based framework for clinical
practice and have also extensively argued in favor of a
facts-plus-values perspective for healthcare [3, 4]. More
than ever values have assumed the foreground of discus-
sions in psychiatry and their diversity, if embraced, is be-
lieved to have great impact not only on psychiatry, but
also on the future of medicine [3].
While facts and values are ontologically inseparable,
their didactic distinction has been useful for understand-
ing evaluative meanings in psychiatric discourse [3]. Ac-
cording to the eminent values scholar John Z. Sadler,
values can be defined as guides to human action that are
subject to praise or blame and that are present, implicit
or explicitly, in all human activities [1]. Thus, they may
pertain to different kinds, five of which at least proved
to be useful in psychiatric classification values research
[1, 5]: (a) aesthetic: related to notions of form and
beauty; (b) epistemic: related to claims of knowledge; (c)
ethical: related to goods, morality and virtue; (d) onto-
logical: related to human nature and existence (and also
the nature of mental disorders); and (e) pragmatic: re-
lated to the practical fulfillment of human actions, in-
cluding administrative, logistic, political, economic and
other practical values.
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Values may also be described according to the way hu-
man action receives evaluative weight. They may be directly
invested in (value-commitments), implied or assumed in
an individual or group world-view (value-entailments) or
weighted according to the effects of actions (value-conse-
quences) [1]. From a linguistic perspective, values may be
terms, which themselves present evaluative meaning, or
semantics—sentences without value-terms, but with
value-content [5]. Due to their multiplicity, values may
conflict and it is especially when that happens that they
become most visible [2]. According to the creator of the
Values-Based Practice, K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, to address
values conflicts in a democratic scenario, stakeholders
should openly discuss values at play and define which of
those values should have precedence over others in a
given context [6].
Although much has been recommended by values
scholars, psychiatric classification endeavors still seem to
only partially acknowledge the role of values. For in-
stance, some critics of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)
claimed its review process was conducted in a “secretive”
way, lacking “adequate public record of the rationale for
changes” [7]. Although the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation (APA) published drafts of DSM-5 criteria for on-
line public feedback and declared interest in closer
collaboration with external stakeholders, including pa-
tient advocacy groups [8], it did not publish the online
comments themselves, nor disclosed how each DSM-5
work group considered and incorporated the feedback
[9]. Also, no official discussion about values at play was
reported.
In this perspective paper, we briefly discuss the inter-
play of some values in the scientific and non-scientific
debate around one of the most debated DSM-5 category
proposals, the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (APS).
The debate surrounding this proposal was heated, full of
conflicting values, and APS ended up not being coded as
an official diagnosis in DSM-5 [10]. We begin by dis-
cussing APS history and the groups of stakeholders in-
volved in its debate. Then, we present some values that
were operative, even when unacknowledged, within this
debate by sorting them out according to Sadler’s values
typology. After, we discuss their interplay, highlighting
the contexts in which they appeared and by whom they
were put in action. We conclude by pointing out some
ethical consequences of a facts-plus-values perspective
in psychiatric classification.
Discussion
APS early history
Considered one of the most severe psychiatric syndromes,
psychosis still evokes a “corrosive pessimism” among psy-
chiatrists [11] and its treatment still is frequently seen as a
palliative aid to patients [12]. The long history of thera-
peutic limitation regarding this diagnosis provided the
impetus to early interventions efforts in the field [13].
However, according to some researchers, decreasing the
duration of untreated psychosis has provided only modest
improvements in outcome for individuals with schizo-
phrenia, leading to interest in possibilities for intervention
before psychosis onset [13, 14]. In mid 1990s this interest
led to the development of the high-risk mental state con-
cept, which pioneered in Australia, but was quickly
adopted and further developed in many specialized re-
search centers around the world, spanning more than 11
countries [15].
Early in the preparation of DSM-5, the Psychotic Dis-
orders Work Group proposed the creation of a new
diagnosis to serve as a placeholder for the high-risk
mental state concept [16]. The proposal was firstly
termed Psychosis Risk Syndrome (PRS) and was criti-
cized as a premature and confusing category. After all,
studies showed that individuals at risk already needed
treatment for their current psychiatric symptoms and
not only the potential preventive effect of early interven-
tion on a “risk syndrome” [17]. Thus, the new category
proposal was reconsidered as a mental disorder per se. It
was renamed APS, according to the term assigned to
one subgroup of patients identified by the high-risk
mental state research criteria [18]. Although other
sets of high-risk criteria existed, most at-risk patients
identified in specialized research centers presented
APS as their main medical complaint. The syndrome
differed from full-blown psychosis due to the sub-
threshold (attenuated) intensity or frequency of pre-
sented symptoms [16].
After the name change, the debate about including
or not APS in DSM-5 proceeded with diverse argu-
ments. Even after DSM-5 task-force rejected APS from
the manual main section, debaters still continued dis-
cussing whether the proposal was ready for DSM-5.1
or 5.2 [15, 16].
Stakeholders
Both in scientific literature and in non-scientific publica-
tions different stakeholders participated in the APS-
debate. For analytical purposes and in order to explore
the wide range of values at play in this debate we se-
lected some stakeholders that presented influential and
diverse opinions, dividing them into four groups. Even
though a prevalent view could be identified within each
group, we do not assume that there was no dissonance
within them. We also do not assume that our selection
of stakeholders is exhaustive of the diversity of partici-
pants and opinions in the APS-debate. The first group
was composed by (i) high-risk mental state researchers,
which have had differences in opinion about to what
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extent their findings were represented by the APS pro-
posal and, consequently, about the merits of including
APS as a new diagnosis in DSM-5 [19]. As a point of
consensus, however, all of them considered APS a useful
concept and supported its inclusion at least as a “condi-
tion for further study” in Section III of DSM-5 [20].
Another group was represented by the (ii) Psychotic Dis-
orders Work Group itself, which proposed and evaluated
the APS construct along the DSM-5 review process.
Composed by 12 members, the Work Group nominees
were approved in 2008 by the APA Board of Trustees
[21]. All members were active researchers on schizo-
phrenia, nine from USA and three from Germany,
Netherlands and UK [13]. In addition to reviewing all
available data about high-risk mental states, the Work
Group consulted a range of experts and considered pub-
lic and expert comments on APS proposal. After DSM-5
field trials, group members determined that more work
was necessary before APS could be considered for inclu-
sion in the main body of the manual. Thus, they recom-
mended its inclusion with specific criteria and description
in Section III, a part of the manual that harbors proposed
conditions for further research [13].
A third group of stakeholders was composed by (iii) pa-
tients, carers and advocacy organizations. Although indi-
vidual patients and carers had the opportunity to post
online comments on DSM-5 drafts through the website
dedicated to the manual [22], direct conversation with
APA Board of Trustees was performed mainly by patient
advocacy organizations [9]. One of the institutions involved
in the APS-debate was the National Alliance on Mental
Illness (NAMI), a well-established North-American non-
profit organization founded in 1979 [23]. With over
200,000 members and expenditures of over US$8.1 mil-
lion on program and membership support, educational
services and patient advocacy [24], NAMI maintained
close connections to APA [9]. During the debate on APS,
this organization supported the inclusion of the proposal
as an official diagnosis in DSM-5 main section [25].
Other authors outside the field of high-risk mental
states and also not involved with APA, DSM-5 task-
force, the Work Group or patient advocacy groups, pub-
licly expressed their opinions about APS inclusion.
Among this group of (iv) external stakeholders was
Allen Frances, chairman of DSM-IV task-force, who ex-
plicitly opposed APS, considering it the worst DSM-5
proposal [26]. Frances strongly advocated its inclusion in
the manual appendix, especially after realizing APS had
real chances to become an official DSM-5 diagnosis [27].
Values guiding arguments in favor of APS inclusion
Relieving suffering and preventing psychosis
According to APS advocates, including it as an official
diagnosis could expand access to appropriate care for
individuals around the globe suffering with this condi-
tion. Associated symptoms could be treated, including
anxiety, depressive symptoms, social withdrawal, and
academic impairment, even for those patients who
would never become psychotic [28]. Also, clinical recog-
nition of APS could hypothetically reduce the rates of
misdiagnoses, improving the process of differential diag-
nosis, promoting better case management and providing
proper reimbursement [18].
Among the stakeholders who acknowledged APS po-
tential benefits to patients were researchers in the field
of high-risk mental states, which considered that the
new proposal could be a “clarion call to the field to focus
attention on these patients and families in need” [20]1.
NAMI also overtly supported APS inclusion, as noted by
the organization’s list of potential and intended benefits
with this diagnosis: “possibly less severe symptoms, more
rapid recovery, prevention of the most devastating con-
sequences of lack of treatment such as homelessness,
criminal justice involvement, and suicides” [25]. In
NAMI’s opinion, and according to one of its institutional
aims, making APS an official diagnosis could also be
useful on illness education and support for individuals at
risk and family members.
Even critics of APS such as Allen Frances implicitly
recognized that the Work Group “has always been well
intentioned” on the proposal [27], as the “debilitating”
nature of psychosis with its “profound lifelong impair-
ments” has never been put in question [13]. The Work
Group hoped that by targeting APS secondary preven-
tion of full psychosis would take place, possibly offering
“substantial life course benefits” to patients [13]. William
Carpenter, the chairman of the Work Group and an
eminent researcher on schizophrenia, declared his per-
sonal view that:
[t]here is much that clinicians can and should do for
care-seeking individuals with distress and dysfunction
who manifest early psychotic-like psychopathology. A
new DSM-5 diagnosis can focus attention on this
syndrome and stimulate the creative acquisition of
new knowledge that may be life altering for afflicted
persons [29].
Efforts to improve patients’ quality of life by trying to
prevent later psychosis and treating current symptoms
are intimately related to medicine’s core value of aiding
the ill [1]. After all, patient’s vulnerability, the intrinsic
undesirability of diseases and disorders, and the profes-
sional commitment to aid the ill are the elements that
form the ethical, value-laden core of medicine and re-
lated health professions [1, 30]. Carpenter’s quotation
overtly presented the value of aiding the ill and sum-
moned the position of researchers in the field, the Work
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Group, and NAMI, who considered APS inclusion as an
ethical value-commitment to aid patients in suffer.
As discussed elsewhere [1], the explicit commitment
to aid the ill is not directly found in DSMs, in which
value-commitments are primarily geared towards aiding
clinicians in their practice (thus, indirectly aiding pa-
tients). This position (i.e., “clinical usefulness” represent-
ing “aiding the ill”) was still valid in DSM-5, as stated on
its preface: “this edition of DSM was designed first and
foremost to be a useful guide to clinical practice” [10].
APS text and criteria in Section III also reinforced this
position by the apparently more descriptive than evaluative
role of value-terms like “distressing”, “disabling”, and
“impaired function” [10].
The degree of importance given by each actor to this
and other values in the debate and how they compared
to values in DSM-5 are illustrated on Table 1.
Research expansion and knowledge acquisition
As already demonstrated by Carpenter’s quotation, some
advocates of APS inclusion in DSM-5 also argued that
this move could “stimulate the creative acquisition of new
knowledge” in the field of high-risk mental states [29]. To
them, although research on the APS concept was already
steadily growing in specialized centers, making this con-
struct an official category listed in a globally used psychi-
atric classification could give the proposal more visibility,
fostering discoveries in the field and providing more re-
search funding [18, 31]. Psychiatrists in specialized centers
argued that research into APS group of patients could have
the potential to “increase our understanding of psychotic-
like symptoms and their trajectories and the emerging
phase of psychotic disorders” [20]. In their opinion APS in-
clusion would also bring psychiatry “in line with other
fields of medicine that identify risk factors for the purposes
of instituting preventative interventions” [28].
The Work Group also presented interest in research
expansion in the field of high-risk mental states, an ap-
parently natural consequence of the fact that its mem-
bers were also active researchers on psychotic disorders
and had the task to develop a manual with multiple pur-
poses, including that to be “a reference for researchers”
[10]. The Work Group recognized that “early detection
and intervention is a high value throughout medicine”
and speculated that “psychiatry will move in this direc-
tion with a number of disorders in the future” [13].
After DSM-5 field trials failed to show APS diagnostic
reliability in clinical settings, Work Group members still
“concluded that there were strong reasons to continue
to evaluate this clinical entity” and then recommended
APS assignment to Section III for further study [13].
The referred section harbored proposals “on which
future research is encouraged” with hope that “such
research will allow the field to better understand these
conditions” [10].
From an evaluative perspective, research expansion
and knowledge acquisition represented another value-
commitment related to APS inclusion, that of scientific
development of high-risk mental states field and of
psychiatry itself. This value-commitment had both an
epistemic and a political nature. Epistemic in the sense
that it was related to a specifically desired way to struc-
ture knowledge (i.e., scientifically). Political in the sense
that by aligning psychiatry with other medical specialties
that perform preventive interventions it would improve
the medical status of psychiatric field, a position ques-
tioned from time to time in the history of the specialty
[32] by those who consider it scientifically underdevel-
oped [3].
Both researchers and Work Group members were
committed to the value of scientific development. Due
to their standpoints, the ethical and the epistemic value-
Table 1 Importance given in discourse to some values according to group of stakeholders in the APS-debate and to the DSM-5
Researchers in
high-risk mental
states
Psychotic
Disorders Work Group
Patient advocacy
groups (NAMI)
External
stakeholders
(Allen Frances)
DSM-5
Value-commitments
Aiding the ill by relieving suffering
and preventing psychosis
[ethical] +++ +++ +++ + +
Scientific development by research
expansion and knowledge acquisition
[epistemic/pragmatic] ++ ++ - - +
Value-consequences
Stigmatization and inappropriate
prescription of antipsychotic medication
[ethical] ++(+) ++ +++ +++ -
Value-entailments
Mental health commercialism and the
influence of political and economic forces
[ontological/pragmatic] (++) - ++ +++ -
Neurobiological reductionism and reification [ontological] (++) - - - -
- : absent; + : implicit; ++ : explicit; +++ : emphasized; ( ) : importance given by part of the group
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commitments were naturally intertwined in their dis-
courses. Specifically in the case of the DSM-5 text, the
epistemic value-commitment of scientific development
was intertwined with that of the already mentioned
“clinical usefulness”. Both NAMI and Frances did not
value APS as a commitment to scientific development.
Values guiding arguments against APS inclusion
Stigmatization and inappropriate prescription of
antipsychotic medication
On the other side of the debate, APS opponents argued
that this diagnosis could undesirably stigmatize and gen-
erate unnecessary treatment to youngsters whose major-
ity would never transition to psychosis [16]. To these
critics, making APS an official diagnostic category could
also promote inappropriate allocation of the already
scarce resources destined to mental health and bring in-
calculable damages to society [9, 18, 27]. Potential inad-
equate prescription of antipsychotic medication, with
their harmful effects of weight gain and increased car-
diovascular risk, could cause a profound impact on the
life of identified population. Moreover, stigmatizing ef-
fects could be unpredictable on the individually and so-
cially perceived sense of autonomy and responsibility of
diagnosed patients [27, 33].
Researchers in the field recognized the possibility of
stigma, discrimination and inappropriate prescription of
antipsychotic medication as one element of the risk-
benefit analysis of APS inclusion in DSM-5 [18]. In a
collective paper reporting points of consensus of their
analysis, they agreed that “on current evidence, anti-
psychotic medication is no more effective than other
more benign treatments and so is typically not recom-
mended” [20]. Regarding stigma, in their opinion “the ef-
fects of creating a new diagnosis, on patients, their
families, and the wider health system, needs to be better
understood” [20].
The Work Group also acknowledged these potential
negative effects of APS inclusion. In its official publica-
tion, however, the group even presented a counter-
argument found in the literature to these concerns: “any
stigma is principally related to behaviors associated with
a diagnosis of APS rather than the diagnosis itself” [13].
Furthermore, according to the counter-argument pre-
sented, “a new APS category will educate clinicians
about the relative lack of utility of antipsychotic medica-
tions in this population and may actually reduce in-
appropriate antipsychotic use among youth” [13].
However, Carpenter’s defense of APS inclusion as an of-
ficial category partially hinged on the prospects of the
development of safer medicines. Carpenter made it clear
that if that happened he “would have less concern about
whether or not some harm is done to people who are in-
cluded in the syndrome” [34]. Thus, the very availability
of medicines could modulate the threshold for including
a new category in DSM-5.
Different from previous stakeholders, NAMI not only
acknowledged, but also emphasized potential negative
effects of making APS an official category. Weighing
risks and benefits, the organization supported APS in-
clusion, but suggested it should be accompanied with
special care to educate clinicians that psychosocial inter-
ventions and support, including family education, were
first line strategies for responding to diagnosed individ-
uals. To NAMI “threshold for prescribing antipsychotic
medications should be very high” [25]. Also, according
to the organization “clinicians and allied mental health
professionals must be aware and particularly sensitive to
the potential negative implications of affixing a diagno-
sis” [25]. NAMI defended that these safeguards should
be implemented to protect the privacy of individuals and
their families, avoiding “over use of this diagnosis” [25].
In the external stakeholders group, Allen Frances also
stressed the unpredictable effects of APS inclusion as a
DSM-5 category. For him, “the treatment most likely to
be used would be antipsychotic medications” which
“have no proven efficacy in preventing psychosis, but
most definitely have terrible side effects” [27]. Frances
stated as a special point of concern that antipsychotic
medication would be “overprescribed to those least able
to resist-the young and those who are most financially
disadvantaged” [27]. Regarding stigma he considered
that “having a label that suggests one is at risk to soon
develop a psychosis would cause the mislabeled person
much unnecessary worry, unnecessarily reduced ambi-
tions, and create great risk of discrimination” [27].
APS opponents warned that including this category
in DSM-5 could perform exactly the opposite effect
to that of aiding the ill. Thus, both stigmatization
and inappropriate prescription of antipsychotic medi-
cation were weighted in the debate as negative ethical
value-consequences. Although they were discussed
together by most groups of stakeholders, APS text in
DSM-5 did not mention these possible negative value-
consequences [22, 35].
Contextual values
Influence of social forces
According to Yung and Nelson, expert researchers of
the Australian group on prevention and early interven-
tion for psychosis, another point of concern regarding
APS inclusion was related to the phenomenon of “diag-
nostic creep,” i.e., the “gradually shifting of the threshold
for a diagnosis in response to clinical practice, political
lobbying, and other social forces” [18]. One possible ex-
ample of “diagnostic creep” would be of a psychiatrist
making an APS diagnosis to a patient with mild psych-
otic symptoms, but technically not meeting enough
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criteria, motivated by insurance reimbursement and
other benefits derived from treatment access through a
formal diagnosis [18, 33]. The authors and colleagues
also questioned if the “rigidity of the US health insur-
ance system, which deems a DSM diagnosis necessary
but not sufficient for coverage, [should] determine what
conditions are seen as psychiatric disorders” [33]. To
these researchers, social forces could potentially alter
APS diagnostic threshold in clinical practice independ-
ently of clinical reasons.
NAMI also acknowledged the role of the referred so-
cial forces in the APS-debate. After suggesting safe-
guards for APS inclusion in DSM-5, the organization
asked: “will these [recommended] practices be followed
in the current health care environment where insurance
companies frequently limit reimbursement for care and
treatment and may favor treatment with medication over
psychosocial interventions?” [25].
Allen Frances heavily stressed the role of social forces
in the APS-debate especially in the figure of pharma-
ceutical companies. He acknowledged that it was not the
intention of the Work Group that APS be initially
treated with antipsychotic medication, but in his opinion
“experience teaches clearly that drug companies will suc-
cessfully exploit any new diagnosis in their unremitting
efforts to boost already swollen sales” [26]. For Frances,
it would not even be safe to rely on professional educa-
tion to reduce the risks of antipsychotic medication
overprescription, as “most of the physician education
come from the very drug companies” [27]. However,
most researchers in the field, the Work Group, and APS
text in DSM-5 did not discuss these external influences
on diagnosis.
In the APS-debate the social forces influencing diag-
nostic threshold mainly assumed the form of political
and economic interests. These forces closely related to
the concept discussed elsewhere [31] of a mental health-
medical-industrial complex, in which different interests
act to expand already established political and economic
power structures [1, 31]. These forces operate based on
a perspective that conceives mental health as a commer-
cial field, subject to market laws and as a means for
profiting [31]. According to this perspective patients are
consumers and medical costs are financial losses to in-
surers. This mental health commercialism represents
one form, among many, of understanding human be-
ings, mental illness and its treatment, and is, thus, an
ontological value-entailment, mostly undiscussed in
the APS-debate.
Neurobiological reductionism and reification
Although many expert researchers in the field initially
argued in favor of APS as a potentially beneficial cat-
egory, some of them had withdrawn their support
especially due to the lack of consensus about how, in
practice, psychiatrists would treat identified patients
[26]. In addition to the influence of economic and polit-
ical forces, the lack of agreement about which model of
“aiding the ill” would be adopted to treat APS patients
also increased the perception of risks related to making
this proposal an official diagnosis. Regarding the issue of
models of care, Patrick McGorry, pioneer in high-risk
mental states research and also member of the Austra-
lian group, pointed out the need to break “the nexus in
the U.S. that drug treatment is the main or only form of
intervention for patients — a nexus reinforced by the
hard neurobiological reductionism that took over Ameri-
can psychiatry from the 1980s” [36].
In the same vein, Yung and colleagues highlighted the
concern of APS “reification” [33] if this proposal ended
up being coded an official DSM-5 category. When a
diagnostic concept is officially listed in a classification
manual and presented with an operational definition,
there is a trend to gradually reify2 this construct [37, 38].
Among the risks of psychiatric categories reification is
the limiting of scientific advances, either by preferential
funding of researches that use these categories, either by
transforming the diagnoses in epistemic blinders that
hinder theoretical formulation (or even imagination) of
alternative models of mental illness [31, 37]. Another
risk associated to reification relates to “framing” of sub-
jective experience according to reified disorder categor-
ies. As discussed elsewhere, “reifying aspects of our
mental life modifies the world in which we live in and
may change who we are and what we do” [39].
In APS context, hard neurobiological reductionism
and reification were also value-entailments regarding the
ontology of mental disorders and their diagnosis. They
also represented chosen ways of conceiving what are hu-
man beings and mental illnesses, what is their nature
(e.g., biological, psychological, social), where and how ill-
nesses manifest, what are their causes, and, consequently,
how they should be treated.
If the unavailability of safer medicines modulated the
threshold for making or not APS an official diagnosis,
the lack of discussion on the ontological perspective
underlying DSM-5 and psychiatry in general, and the in-
fluence of economic and political forces, both cast doubt
into which would be the threshold for choosing medi-
cines over other therapies. Although these thresholds
are theoretically attributed to the influence of epistemic
values, such as scientific rigor and evidence-based medi-
cine, studies have shown a trend in psychiatry towards
use of medications even in disagreement with clinical
guidelines and current scientific evidence [19]. This ob-
servation illustrates two important points: first, how dif-
ferent kinds of values (e.g., pragmatic and ontological)
may work together to influence a decision; and, second,
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how there is no guarantee that values expected to
play the highest priority roles in a given situation
(e.g., epistemic) will actually do it.
Most researchers in the field, NAMI, Allen Frances
and the Work Group did not mention the value-
entailments of neurobiological reductionism and reifi-
cation in the APS-debate.
APS out of DSM-5 main text
Despite of a long and intense debate full of conflicting
values, APA official justification for rejecting APS from
DSM-5 main text was the failure of field trials to recruit
a large enough sample of patients to measure APS diag-
nostic reliability [40]. APA published results from field
studies in January 2013 on two papers written by Darrel
Regier, vice-president of DSM-5 task-force, and other
members [40, 41]. In the second paper authors declared
that, although the sampling method used in DSM-5 field
trials yielded greater statistical power than in previous
DSM studies, it did not obtain adequate sample sizes for
some conditions. The “difficulty in recruiting patients
with relatively low prevalence mental disorders [includ-
ing APS] was not fully appreciated by either the [re-
search] sites or the investigators” [40]. In the first article,
authors stated that “the results of the DSM-5 Field Trials
were intended to help to inform the DSM-5 decision-
making process (along with many other factors unrelated
to field trials)” [41]. Nevertheless, APA did not present
other reasons for APS rejection beyond the unknown
diagnostic reliability, nor discussed, to our knowledge,
the other factors involved in this decision.
As demonstrated through our brief exploration of
values in the APS-debate, the lack of an official discus-
sion about values at play on DSM-5 elaboration process
was mirrored by the manual final text [7], still written
with a “value-free” and “objectivist” approach [3, 42].
Ethical consequences of a facts-plus-values perspective in
psychiatric classification
Medicine, including psychiatry, is a moral enterprise,
and has been so regarded since Hippocratic times [30].
However, as we have seen through the APS-debate, eth-
ical values represent only one kind of values at stake in
medical practice. We argue that although ethical values
are by far the most acknowledged and praised ones, epi-
stemic, aesthetic, pragmatic and ontological values are
no less important in guiding professional actions, includ-
ing clinical activities, medical research, and psychiatric
classification [5]. If this argument is true, exploring differ-
ent kinds of values at play is essential to correctly identify
top-priority values and, consequently, to acknowledge
and address potential value-disputes in a given situation
or endeavor.
As we have seen so far, the lack of a fully open, trans-
parent, and fact-plus-values informed review process
may have opened DSM-5 to harsh criticism. Regarding
APS rejection from DSM-5 main section, the disclosure
of only one reason by APA brought many questions
to the fore. If unknown diagnostic reliability solely
accounted for rejecting APS, was it more important
than the previously mentioned potential unintended
consequences of this new category? Did APA also fear
those consequences? If so, why not officially disclos-
ing this concern?
In the APS-debate even patient involvement, which
represented a new historical step in DSM elaboration,
raised important questions, such as to what extent polit-
ical and economic values may influence the implementa-
tion of scientific treatment guidelines for psychiatric
conditions in clinical practice. Also, a most important
question arose, that of what are stakeholders’ assump-
tions about the nature of mental illnesses, about what
represents a good treatment, and, ultimately, about what
constitutes a “good life” worth living by patients [1, 30].
Conclusion
Multiple values permeated the debate about making or
not APS an official DSM-5 diagnosis, including ethical,
but also epistemic, political, economic and ontological
ones. The prominence given to some values, and the
lack of discussion about others, generated divergent po-
sitions among researchers, clinicians, patient advocacy
groups and other stakeholders. As has already been ar-
gued elsewhere [1], many critiques to the DSMs and
their review processes precisely arise from the lack of
open discussion about values that remain implicit. As
demonstrated by the APS-debate, although medicine is
primarily an ethical endeavor, values of different kinds
that take part in it also shape the profession. Thus, it
may be strategic to openly discuss values at play in the
elaboration of diagnostic tools and classificatory systems.
This task, more than scientifically or politically signifi-
cant, is ethically important.
Endnotes
1We added emphasis to quotations in order to highlight
evaluative content. All emphases are ours.
2Reification is understood in this context as a “misplaced
concreteness” [39], making psychiatric diagnoses to be
thought of, and used as, concrete objects, entities having
independent existence on their own, instead of abstract
and hypothetical formulations about reality [37, 39].
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